

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00
DODE-00 (ISO) W

-----106254 161931Z /42

O R 161300Z JUN 78
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8950
INFO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 DAR ES SALAAM 2593

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OAU, TZ, CG
SUBJECT: AFRICA POLICY; SHABA, SOVIET/CUBAN INVOLVEMENT

REF: STATE 153145

SUMMARY. NYERERE IS UNLIKELY TO BE RECEPTIVE TO
SUGGESTIONS THAT SOVIET/CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA IS
NOT IN AFRICA'S INTEREST. HE MIGHT, HOWEVER, TAKE AN
INTEREST IN CONSULTATIONS THAT SOUGHT TO END CROSS-
BORDER VIOLENCE AND WHICH DEALT WITH DIFFICULTIES OF
MAJOR TRIBAL GROUPS DIVIDED BY INTERNATIONAL BORDERS.
INVOLVEMENT BY THE UN WOULD PROBABLY BE MORE EFFECTIVE
THAN THE OAU. END SUMMARY.

1. WE HAVE A FEW PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON HOW NYERERE
MIGHT RESPOND TO MAIN POINTS OF AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S

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HELPFUL INITIATIVE.

2. NYERERE'S PERCEPTION ON AFRICAN PROBLEM-SOLVING.
NYERERE RECOGNIZES THIS IS AT A RUDIMENTARY STAGE.

A) PROBLEM-SOLVING BY AFRICANS. IN COMMON WITH OTHER
AFRICAN LEADERS HE DOES NOT TRY TO ENGAGE OAU IN MORE

THAN IT CAN HANDLE, HENCE MINIMAL OAU INVOLVEMENT TO DATE IN SOLVING AFRICAN PROBLEMS. OAU IS PRINCIPALLY VALUABLE AS A SYMBOL OF AFRICAN "UNITY." NYERERE WOULD NOT WANT TO SEE ITS SYMBOLIC VALUE LESSENED BY DRAMATIC OAU FAILURES. PREFERRED ROUTE IS CONSULTATION AMONG AND MEDIATION BY LIKE-MINDED STATES. HOWEVER, LIMITATIONS AND FAILURES OF THIS MECHANISM ARE OBVIOUS TO ALL.

B) PROBLEM-SOVING BY NON-AFRICANS. (A) A WESTERN ROLE IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO NYERERE FOR HISTORICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL REASONS. (A MAJOR EXCEPTION ISSOUTHERN AFRICA WHERE NYERERE APPROVES OF NON-MILITARY WESTERN ROLE BECAUSE HE BELIEVES WEST CAN USE ITS "INFLUENCE" WITH WHITE MINORITY REGIMES TO AFRICA'S ADVANTAGE.) MOREOVER, THE WEST TENDS TO BECOME INVOLVED ON THE SIDE OF NON-PROGRESSIVE AFRICAN REGIMES, THEREBY INTERFERING WITH AFRICA'S SOCILAIST DEVELOPMENT AND THREATENING THOSE STATES WHICH ARE ALREADY SOCIALIST.

(2) NYERERE RECOGNIZES THAT SOVIETS AND CUBANS MAY DSHAVE IMPERIALIST INTENTIONS BUT BELIEVES THEY CAN BE USEFUL IN SOLVING PROBLEMS WHEN INVITED TO HELP. THEY HAVE SO FAR NOT BECOME INVOLVED WITHOUT INVITATION AND HAVE PLAYED A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN WHAT NYERERE BELIEVES TO BE TWO VERY WORTHY CAUSES, ANGOLA AND ETHIOPIA. SOVIETS AND CUBANS ARE INHERENTLY MUCH LESS SUSPECT THAN THE WEST AS THEY ASSIST "PROGRESSIVE" AFRICAN
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REGIMES AND INDIRECTLY SAFEGUARD SOCIALIST ADVANCES IN OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING TANZANIA. NYERERE IS UNLIKELY TO REJECT SOVIET/CUBAN ROLE ON GROUNDS THAT IT INEVITABLY WILL LEAD TO EAST-WEST COMPETITION IN AFRICA. HE DOES, HOWEVER, FEAR SUCH COMPETITION AND SPOKE OUT SHARPLY JUNE 8 WHEN HE THOUGHT HE SAW IT COMING.

3. LESSONS OF SHABA. IT WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT TO GET NYERERE TO DRAW THE SAME LESSONS FROM SHABA THAT WE DO. THE SHABA EPISODE CERTAINLY HELPED CONFIRM HIS VIEW OF VENALITY OF MOBUTU'S REGIME. WESTER INTERVENTION AND SUBSEQUENT TALK OF A WESTERN-SUPPORTED AND - ORGANIZED PAN-AFRICAN SECURITY FORCE REKINDLED HIS SUSPICIONS THAT FORMER COLONIAL POWERS (JOINED BY US) HAVE AN ACTIVE INTEREST IN RE-COLONIZATION. MOST IMPORTANT, NYERERE'S FEARS THAT US ONLY INTERESTED IN AFRICA TO COMPETE WITH SOVIETS HAVE BEEN RE-ACTIVATED.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00
DODE-00 (ISO) W

-----106277 161932Z /46

O R 161300Z JUN 78
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8951
INFO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 DAR ES SALAAM 2593

EXDIS

4. CONSULTATIONS ON PROBLEM-SOLVING. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, NYERERE HAS A STRONG INTEREST IN ELIMINATING CROSS-BORDER VIOLENCE IN AFRICA. AS MUCH AS ANY OTHER AFRICAN LEADER, HE IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROBLEMS OF MAJOR TRIBAL GROUPS DIVIDED BY INTERNATIONAL BORDERS, ESPECIALLY WHEN SUCH GROUPS ARE EXCLUDED FROM PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENTS. TANGOV OFFICIALS POINT TO CONSCIOUS EFFORT TO GIVE TANZANIA'S MAKONDE AND MASAI A STAKE IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. DIVIDED TRIBAL GROUPS ALSO SHOULD BE FREE TO CROSS INTERVENING BORDERS. TANGOV OFFICIALS POINT TO PROBLEMS OF LUNDA IN SHABA AND ANGOLA AS ILLUSTRATIVE OF DIFFICULTIES THAT CAN BE CAUSED WHEN THESE PRINCIPLES ARE NOT TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

5. NYERERE'S PRESCRIPTION FOR A SHABA SETTLEMENT, THEREFORE, MIGHT WELL INCLUDE ANGOLAN AND ZAIREIAN ASSURANCES AGAINST CROSS-BORDER VIOLENCE, FREEDOM OF
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MOVEMENT FOR LUNDA, AND SIGNIFICANT LUNDA REPRESENTATION IN MOBUTU'S REGIME. THIS IS ONLY ILLUSTRATIVE OF AN APPROACH NYERERE MIGHT TAKE. IN CASE OF SHABA, HE WOULD PROBABLY BE UNWILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN

ANYTHING THAT WOULD MAKE MOBUTU'S POSITION MORE SECURE
EXCEPT PERHAPS AN END TO CROSS-BORDER VIOLENCE AS
ANGOLA WOULD ALSO BE A BENEFICIARY.

6. WE UNDERSTAND THAT NYERERE IS CONCERNED THAT CUBAN
AND SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA AND THE WESTERN
RESPONSE (ESPECIALLY IN SHABA) COULD LEAD TO DEEP
DIVISIONS IN AFRICA. IN ASSISTING AFRICANS TO DEVELOP
THEIR OWN PROBLEM-SOLVING INSTITUTIONS CARE MUST BE
TAKEN THAT THE US DOES NOT END UP ON ONE SIDE AND THUS
RISK DIVIDING AFRICA FURTHER. AT KHARTOUM, NYERERE IS
LIKELY TO CONCENTRATE ON KEEPING THE OAU TOGETHER AND
THUS AVOID PROBLEM-SOLVING ISSUES. HE WILL SEEK ABOVE
ALL TO PREVENT A REPLAY OF SPECIAL OAU ADDIS ABABA
SUMMIT ON RECOGNITION OF MPLA REGIME IN ANGOLA WHERE,
AS HE HAS DESCRIBED IT, "AFRICA DIVIDED 24 VOTES FOR THE
RUSSIANS AND 24 FOR THE AMERICANS WITH NONE FOR AFRICA."
NYERERE IS THEREFORE MORE LIKELY TO BE RECEPTIVE TO A
UN ROLE IN AFRICAN PROBLEM-SOLVING ALTHOUGH WE AR
NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT HE WOULD WELCOME EVEN THIS.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLICIES, SPHERE OF INFLUENCE
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 16 jun 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978DARES02593
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780252-0688
Format: TEL
From: DAR ES SALAAM
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780651/aaaabsib.tel
Line Count: 191
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: e827e287-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 78 STATE 153145
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 26 apr 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2326295
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: AFRICA POLICY; SHABA, SOVIET/CUBAN INVOLVEMENT
TAGS: PEPR, MPOL, TZ, CG, UR, CU, OAU
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/e827e287-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014